

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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DRC-01 /153 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7560

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 4963

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: REVISED: WG PAPER ON AIR MANPOWER

REF: A) STATE 196467;

B) USNATO 4698

C) USNATO 4279

1. WE TRANSMIT BELOW AN EXTENSIVELY REVISED DRAFT OF THE AIR
MANPOWER PAPER, WHICH WG CHAIRMAN SMITH REWROTE ON BASIS OF SEPTEMBER
10 WG DISCUSSION.

2. AT THAT MEETING, FRG REP (DZIALAS) ACCEPTED PREVIOUS DRAFT.
UK REP (ABRAHAMS) PUTFORWARD TEXTUAL REVISIONS AND U.S. REP
PRESENTED COMMENTS ON CONCLUSIONS (REF A). CANADIAN REP BELIEVED
PAPER SHOULD POINT TOWARD FURTHER STUDY OF MILITARY AND TECHNICAL
ASPECTS OF AIR MANPOWER ISSUES. BELGIAN REP (WILLOT) DEMURRED
BECAUSE SPC HAD NOT INSTRUCTED WG TO INITIATE SUCH STUDIES AND
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BECAUSE STUDIES COULD IMPLY AIR MANPOWER WILL BE INCLUDED IN
MBFR. NUMBER OF REPS SUGGESTED REVISION OF EARLIER DRAFT AND CHAIRMAN
SHAPED DISCUSSION TOWARD PAPER MORE BALANCED THAN PREVIOUS DRAFT
IN ADDRESSING IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AND WARSAW PACT AND MORE RELEVANT

TO AD HOC GROUP QUESTIONS ON AIR MANPOWER.

3. COMMENT: WITH RESPECT TO PARA 5, REF A, WE BELIEVE EARLIER DRAFTS OF THIS PAPER REFLECTED RESISTANCE OF SOME ON STAFF LEVEL TO POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER. HOWEVER, SINCE WG CHAIRMAN TOOK OVER DRAFTING SUCH BIAS SEEMS IN CHECK. NEW PAPER IN OUR VIEW IS MUCH BETTER THAN PREVIOUS DRAFT. REFTEL A COMMENTS ARE REFLECTED IN CONCLUSIONS.

4. PARA 18 C OF PAPER PICKS UP IDEA IN EARLIER UK COMMENTS (PARA 8 REF C) WHICH ARGUED THAT ONE HAS FIRST TO GET EACH NATION TO EXAMINE THE EFFECT OF VARIOUS LEVELS OF AIR MANPOWER CUTS ON ITS OWN AIR CAPABILITY BEFORE REACHING ANY CONCLUSIONS ON REDUCTIONS. WG CHAIRMAN FEELS STRONGLY THAT WG COULD NOT ASSESS REDUCTIONS WITHOUT SUCH NATIONAL INPUTS AND IF WG IS TO UNDERTAKE ANY REDUCTION STUDY IT SHOULD BE WITH CLEAR UNDERSTANDING ON PART OF PARTICIPANTS THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE NECESSARY INPUTS.

5. REF A ASKS WHETHER FURTHER STUDIES ARE REQUIRED BEFORE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF INCLUDING MANPOWER, UK REP SAID SEPTEMBER 10 STUDIES WOULD BE ESSENTIAL BEFORE ANY CONSIDERATION OF AIR MANPOWER ISSUE. WE BELIEVE NUMBER OF OTHER ALLIES WOULD SHARE THIS VIEW, PARTICULARLY THOSE OPPOSED TO INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER. IN ANY EVENT, PRESENT DRAFT PROVIDES U.S. WITH OPPORTUNITY TO CHANNEL ALLIED THINKING AND POSSIBLE FUTURE STUDIES ALONG LINES OF WASHINGTON

CURRENT REVIEW AND TOWARD DECISIONS WASHINGTON MAY ADOPT. WE SUGGEST WASHINGTON TAKE CLOSE LOOK AT DRAFT WITH THIS IN MIND- AND ALSO WITH EYE TO PUTTING DOWN EARLY ANY POINTS WASHINGTON MAY FIND UNHELPFUL.

6. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON COMMENT BEFORE SEPTEMBER 24 WG MEETING.

7. BEGIN TEXT

SUBJECT: MBFR-IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVISED NATO ASSESSMENTS OF
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NATO AND WP FORCES MANPOWER IN THE NGA AS OF MID-1974-AIR
MANPOWER

1. AT THE REQUEST(1) OF THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE, THE MBFR WORKING GROUP HAVE EXAMINED THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NATO ESTIMATES(2) OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER AT MID-1974 IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA (NGA).

2. THE WORKING GROUP HAVE EXAMINED SEPARATELY THE MILITARY/ TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF:

A. THE REVISED GROUND FORCE FIGURES IN THE NGA AS OF MID-1974(3).

B. POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS OF CERTAIN ANOMALIES BETWEEN THE MANNING PRACTICES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT DESIGNED TO ENDUCE THE WP POWERS TO AGREE ON THE RANGE OF FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS(4).

- (1) AC/119-R(74)69
- (2) AC/276-D(74)6
- (3) AC/276-D(74)7
- (4) SITCEN 1603 DTG AUG 161535Z (AGV(74)65)

SITUATION

3. THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL(1) STATES THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MADE ONLY IN THE CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES OF NATO AND THE WP IN CENTRAL EUROPE. OTHER FORCES (AIR AND NUCLEAR) HAVE HITHERTO BEEN EXCLUDED FROM CONSIDERATION IN MBFR. THUS, THE NATO AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT YET ADDRESSED THE IMPLICATIONS OF REDUCTIONS IN AIR FORCES IN ANY DETAIL; NOR, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE "MIXED PACKAGE", HAS ANY ASSESSMENT BEEN ATTEMPTED OF THE RISKS ATTENDANT ON SUCH REDUCTIONS. AN EXAMINATION IS BEING MADE OF THE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES OF NATO TACTICAL AIR FORCES IN THE CENTRAL REGION, WHICH INCLUDES ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF CERTAIN HYPOTHETICAL REDUCTIONS. WHEN FINALISED, THE REPORT ON THIS STUDY SHOULD PROVIDE INSIGHTS INTO THE POSSIBLE EFFECT OF AIRCRAFT REDUCTIONS. THIS STUDY DID NOT ADDRESS THE IMPLICATIONS OF REDUCTIONS IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER.

SCOPE OF THE WORKING GROUP STUDY

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4. THE AD HOC GROUP VIENNA HAVE REQUESTED (2) GUIDANCE ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS RELATED TO AIR FORCE MANPOWER:

A. DO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL CONSIDER THAT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF A PHASE 1 AGREEMENT RELATING TO GROUND FORCES, THE ALLIANCE

- (1) C-M(73)83(FINAL)

- (2) ISD/84, PARA 15

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WILL HAVE TO ENVISAGE SOME FORM OF LIMITATION ON THE AIR FORCE
MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTION.

B. THE COUNCIL MAY ALSO WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE
TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE ALLIANCE TO OFFER TO EXTEND REDUCTIONS
TO AIR FORCE MANPOWER, AND THUS BRING AIR FORCE MANPOWER WITHIN
THE SCOPE OF A REVISED COMMON CEILING.

5. THE FIRST OF THESE QUESTIONS ENVISAGES A LIMITATION ON
AIR FORCE MANPOWER BUT NO REDUCTIONS. THE SECOND QUESTION
REQUIRES CONSIDERATION OF THE EFFECTS OF REDUCTIONS IN AIR MANPOWER.
THE WORKING GROUP HAVE ADDRESSED THE ISSUES UNDER THESE HEADINGS.

LIMITATION ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER

6. IT SHOULD BE TECHNICALLY AND MILITARILY PRACTICABLE TO APPLY
A LIMITATION TO AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA, FOR BOTH NATO
AND WARSAW PACT, BY, FOR EXAMPLE:

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A. AN AGREEMENT NOT TO INCREASE AIR FORCE MANPOWER ABOVE LEVELS
OBTAINING AT THE DATE OF THE AGREEMENT.

B. EXTEND A POSTULATED COMMON CEILING, FOR NATO AND WP GROUND
FORCES, TO EMBRACE AIR FORCE MANPOWER. THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER
STRENGTHS COULD BE ADDED TO THE GROUND FORCE FIGURES, WITHOUT
ADDRESSING AIR FORCES FOR REDUCTIONS.

7. THESE ALTERNATIVES WOULD BE SIMILAR IN THEIR EFFECTS. BOTH
WOULD PROVIDE A SAFEGUARD, BY AGREEMENT, AGAINST CIRCUMVENTION
OF GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS BY INCREASES IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER.
NEITHER WOULD ENTAIL REDUCTIONS IN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL. BOTH
WOULD NECESSITATE AN EFFECTIVE CEILING ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER
IN PEACETIME CONDITIONS AT CURRENT LEVELS: FOR NATO, THIS WOULD
NOT IMPOSE ANY ADDITIONAL RESTRICTION TO THOSE ALREADY APPLIED
BY OTHER POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL PRESSURES.

REDUCTIONS IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER

8. THERE ARE SEVERAL HYPOTHETICAL WAYS IN WHICH THE PROBLEMS OF ADDRESSING AIR MANPOWER FOR REDUCTIONS IN MBFR MIGHT BE STUDIED, AMONG WHICH ARE:

A. AGGREGATION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER TO PROVIDE A NEW COMMON CEILING FIGURE WHICH WOULD PERMIT NATO AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AT A SELECTED LEVEL AS WELL AS GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AT THE PRESENT, OR ANY OTHER, PROPOSED LEVEL.

B. TO HAVE SEPARATE GROUND AND AIR COMMON CEILINGS AND THEREFORE DIFFERENT GROUND AND AIR REDUCTION PERCENTAGES FOR NATO.

THESE POSSIBILITIES HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE WORKING GROUP.

9. THE WORKING GROUP HAVE CONSIDERED THE IMPLICATIONS OF ADDRESSING AIR FORCE MANPOWER FOR REDUCTIONS, TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH AN EXAMINATION IS PRACTICABLE WITHOUT CONSTRUCTING SPECIFIC HYPOTHETICAL REDUCTION OPTIONS FOR THE AIR FORCES CONCERNED. THE DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWS IS, THEREFORE, NECESSARILY COUCHED IN GENERAL TERMS.

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10. NATO ASSESSMENTS OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER, (NATO AND WP) IN THE NGA AT ANNEX A, SHOW THAT THE TWO SIDES ARE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL - NATO 196,000, WP 208,000. THIS COULD, HOWEVER, CHANGE IF THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES WERE TO BE CHANGED TO RESOLVE ANOMALIES(1).

1. THE APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS PROVIDING ANY FIRM INDICATION OF COMPARATIVE COMBAT CAPABILITIES, BECAUSE:

A. THE STRUCTURES OF THE OPPOSING AIR FORCES VARY WIDELY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NATO FIGURES INCLUDE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL EMPLOYED ON GROUND-TO-AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS

(1) SEE SITCEN 1603 (AGV(74)65)

(APPROX. 28,000) AND SSMS (3,700) WHEREAS THESE DUTIES ARE CARRIED OUT BY GROUND FORCES FOR THE WP, EXCEPT FOR THE GDR GROUND-TO-AIR DEFENCES (13,000).

B. MANY OF THE AIR FORCES ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT FUNCTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY AIRMEN IN NATO ARE EFFECTED FOR WP AIR FORCES BY GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL.

C. THE MIX OF AIRCRAFT AND TYPES AND ROLES VARY SUBSTANTIALY, AS DO THE CAPABILITIES AND QUALITY OF AIRCRAFT.

12. NATO AIR FORCES HAVE LITTLE OR NO MOBILISATION POTENTIAL IN THE PROBABLE TIME SCALE OF A FUTURE CONFLICT, IN THE SENSE THAT THENUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENTS AVAILABLE IN PEACE NOT NECESSARILY IN THE NGAL WILL NOT BE INCREASED IN WAR, NOR WILL THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER BE INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY. THE OPERATION OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND ASSOCIATED GROUND ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENTS IS A MANPOWERINTENSIVE PROCESS, WITH A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTENSITY AND TYPE OF OPERATIONS REQUIRED AND THE NUMBER OF MEN REQUIRED TO MAN AND SUPPORT THEM. MANPOWER CONTROL AND FINANCIAL STRINGENCY, IN MOST IF NOT ALL NATO AIR FORCES, HAVE OPERATED TO REDUCE MANPOWER TO LEVELS AT OR NEAR THE MINIMUM FOR OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY, IN PEACE AND THEREFORE IN WAR. THERE IS UNLIDELY, THEREFORE, TO BE SUBSTANTIAL SCOPE FOR AIR
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MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WITHOUT SOME DEGRADATION IN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY THROUGH:

A. REDUCTIONS IN NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE BOTH IN PEACE AND WAR.

B. INABILITY TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY (I.E. OPERATION IN ALL ROLES APPROPRIATE TO A PARTICULAR AIRCRAFT TYPE).

C. REDUCED READINESS STATUS.

D. REDUCED TARGET COVERAGE.

E. LOWERING OF GENERAL TRAINING (AND, BY IMPLICATION, OPERATIONAL) STANDARDS.

13. THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH FACTORS WOULD APPLY TO WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES CANNOT BE ASSESSED. AS MUCH OF THE WP AIR FORCES' ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT SERVICES IS PROVIDED BY THE GROUND FORCES, AND AS THE WP AIR FORCES OPERATE MANY MORE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT THAN NATO IN THE NGA, DISPERSED OVER MORE AIRFIELDS, IT MIGHT BE HELD, PRIMA FACIE, THAT THE EFFECTS OF AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WOULD BE AT LEAST AS WERIOUS FOR WP AIR FORCES AS FOR NATO'S. HOWEVER, PRECISE ASSESSMENTS OF THE EFFECTS FOR THE WP WOULD NECESSITATE A DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF PACT MANNING AND OPERATING PRACTICES. SUCH INFORMATION IS NOT AVAILABLE.

14. WHILE, IN GENERAL, IT IS LIKELY THAT REDUCTIONS IN NATO AIR MANPOWER ON ANY SIGNIFICANT SCALE WOULD INVOLVE REDUCTION IN EFFICIENCY OR OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY FOR NATO (SEE PARA 11), THESE EFFECTS CANNOT BE MEASURED PRECISELY.

REDUCTIONS IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER MIGHT POSSIBLY BE FOUND WITHOUT A REDUCTION IN NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT OR GROUND ENVIRONMENTAL EQUIPMENTS IF THE PERSONNEL CONCERNED COULD BE FOUND FROM WITHIN

ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT ECHELONS HAVING FUNCTIONS NOT BEARING DIRECTLY ON OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. ADJUSTMENTS OF NATIONAL MOBILISATION ARRANGEMENT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO RE-INSTATE SUCH AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN EMERGENCY, SO AS TO ENSURE FULL MANNING IN WARTIME.

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15. THE PRACTICABILITY AND TOLERABILITY OF SUCH AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WOULD ONLY BE ASSESSED SUBSTANTIVELY BY NATO NATIONS INDIVIDUALLY AFTER DETAILED STUDY OF HYPOTHETICAL MANPOWER CUTS AT ILLUSTRATIVE SCALES OF SAY 5 PERCENT 10 PERCENT AND 15 PERCENT. THE EFFECTS COULD DIFFER SUBSTANTIALLY BETWEEN STATIONED NATO AIR FORCES (CA, UK, US) AND INDIGENOUS FORCES: FOR THE STATIONED AIR FORCES, IT WOULD BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE TO WITHDRAW ELEMENTS (INCLUDING AIRCRAFT) FROM THE NGA AND TO RETURN THEM IN AN EMERGENCY ON THE SAME SCALE WITHIN A VERY SHORT TIME. THE EFFECTS ON INDIVIDUAL AIR FORCES WOULD

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ALSO VARY, WITHIN THOSE CLASSED AS STATIONED AND WITHIN THE INDIGENOUS

AIR FORCES. THE OPERATING AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ARRANGEMENT COULD BE SIGNIFICANT. REDUCTIONS OF AIR MANPOWER BY NATIONS INDIGENOUS TO THE NGA, HOWEVER, WOULD MEAN EFFECTIVELY DEMOBILISATION, DISBANDMENT OF TRANSFER TO THE RESERVE OF THE AIR MANPOWER CONCERNED: IF THE AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS POSTULATED

NECESSITATED A REDUCTION IN AIRCRAFT, THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE AT READINESS FOR WAR WOULD THUS BE REDUCED.

16. SIMILAR CONSIDERATIONS COULD APPLY TO SOVIET AND NSWP AIR FORCES. THE SOVIET AIR FORCE PROVIDES A HIGHER PROPORTION OF TOTAL WP AIRCRAFT IN THE NGA THAN DO THE NATO STATIONED AIR FORCES.

ANY MANPOWER (OR AIRCRAFT) WITHDRAWN BY THE SOVIETS COULD READILY BE REPLACED.

17. FINDINGS

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THE WORKING GROUP FIND THAT, IN MILITARY/TECHNICAL TERMS:

A. IT WOULD BE PRACTICABLE TO APPLY A "NON-INCREASE" AGREEMENT, OR FORCE LIMITATION AGREEMENT, TO AIR MANPOWER IN THE NGA, AT CURRENT AIR FORCE MANNING LEVELS.

B. IT WOULD ALSO BE PRACTICABLE TO EXTEND A MANPOWER COMMON CEILING TO EMBRACE GROUND AND AIR FORCES, WITHOUT ADDRESSING AIR FORCES FOR REDUCTIONS.

C. NEITHER POSSIBILITY WOULD IMPOSE ANY RESTRICTION ON NATO EFFECTIVELY MORE STRINGENT IN PEACETIME CONDITIONS THAN THOSE ALREADY IMPOSED BY NATIONAL AUTHORITIES ON AIR FORCE STRENGTHS.

18. AFTER THIS PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF REDUCTIONS IN AIR MANPOWER, IN GENERAL TERMS, THE WORKING GROUP FIND THAT:

A. IT COULD BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE TO ADDRESS AIR MANPOWER FOR REDUCTIONS IN MBFR WITHOUT EXPLICITLY ADDRESSING AIRCRAFT AND GROUND ENVIRONMENT FACILITIES. HOWEVER, ADDRESSING AIR MANPOWER FOR REDUCTIONS COULD, IN ITSELF, INDIRECTLY INVOLVE REDUCTIONS IN AIRCRAFT AND GROUND ENVIRONMENT FACILITIES: AN COULD MOREOVER EXPOSE THOSE ELEMENTS TO WP PRESSURE FOR REDUCTIONS.

B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AIR MANPOWER AND THE OOPERATIONAL CAPABILITY WITHIN AIR FORCES INVOLVES COMPLEX TECHNICAL AND MILITARY ISSUES WHICH REQUIRE FURTHER ANALYSES TO ENABLE ACCURATE ASSESSMENT TO BE MADE OF THE EFFECTS OF ANY MANPOWER REDUCTION.

C. IT WOULD BE USEFUL-AND NECESSARY FOR SUBSTANTIVE JUDGEMENTS- TO STUDY THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL AIR FORCES OF MANPOWER CUTS AT SCALES OF (SAY) 5 PERCENT, 10 PERCENT AND 15 PERCENT. SUCH STUDIES MIGHT INDICATE THE EFFECTS OF SUCH MANPOWER CUTS IN TERMS OF RESULTANT REDUCTIONS, IF ANY, IN AIRCRAFT AND/OR OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY.

D. THE IMPLICATIONS OF REDUCTIONS IN TACTICAL AIRCRAFT, ALREADY UNDER ACTIVE STUDY(1), SHOULD BE PRESSED FORWARD WITH ALL

DELIBERATE SPEED.

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(1) AC/276(SGTA)-N/32(FINAL DRAFT)

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